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proof.holdings MCP server
MCP server for the proof.holdings API — 196 tools for identity verification, proofs, and asset management
Tested by ConnectATDScore 89 out of 100. Tested 2026-11-18 on package version 1.13.0. Package: @proof-holdings/mcp-server · source
Score breakdown
| Runs | 18 / 20 | |
|---|---|---|
| Tool descriptions | 19 / 20 | |
| Package safety | 20 / 20 | |
| Maintenance | 20 / 20 | |
| Adoption | 12 / 20 |
What we saw
- Starts and answers the MCP handshake: yes (4.3 seconds including download)
- Tools offered: 220
- Last published: 2026-11-16
- Weekly downloads (npm): 1,678
- License: MIT · Direct dependencies: 5
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create_verification11 of 11 parameters describedCreate a new identity verification. Initiates a verification flow for an asset identifier (phone number, email, domain, social handle, wallet address, account, or Telegram bot). Agent usage: pass the asset `type`, the delivery `channel`, and the `identifier` (e.g. type "phone", channel "sms", identifier "+37060000000"; or type "email", channel "email", identifier "user@example.com"). The response carries a `challenge` object with the instruction for the chosen channel — except a `telegram_bot` verification made with a LIVE key, which the server completes on the spot and answers with `status: verified` plus a proof token and no challenge at all; with a `pk_test_` key that same call stays pending and does carry a challenge. On the messenger channels it also carries `challenge.deep_link` — pass THAT to render_auth_link to give the user a clickable link and a QR code. This endpoint returns no `qr_text` at all. For OTP-based flows (sms/email), the user receives a code — poll get_verification or use wait_for_verification to track completion. For Telegram/WhatsApp, the user clicks the deep link to verify. The user does not see tool results — most clients fold them away, render_auth_link's output included. Before you wait or poll, put what the user must act on into your own reply text: the link itself (not a sentence announcing it), the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_verification1 of 1 parameter describedGet a verification by ID. Returns the full verification object including status, channel, and proof token if verified. Before calling this for a challenge you created, make sure your reply text already shows the user what to act on — the link itself, the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox; a link that appeared only in a tool result is one they never saw. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_verifications5 of 5 parameters describedList verifications with optional filters. Returns paginated results. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
trigger_verification1 of 1 parameter describedTrigger a DNS/HTTP verification check for a pending domain verification. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
submit_verification_code2 of 2 parameters describedSubmit an OTP/challenge code for a pending verification. Accepted ONLY where we delivered the code out-of-band to the party being verified: type "email", and type "domain" with channel "email". Any other pair answers 400 unsupported_for_type and completes elsewhere — use trigger_verification (POST /verifications/:id/verify) for a domain over dns/http/auto; a phone completes when the code reaches us FROM that number; social completes through its OAuth callback; a telegram_bot is already verified at creation. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
resend_verification1 of 1 parameter describedResend a verification message (email channel only). Generates and sends a new code. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
test_verify1 of 1 parameter describedAuto-complete a verification in test mode (pk_test_* API keys only). Useful for testing flows without real OTP delivery. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_verified_users2 of 2 parameters describedList verified users grouped by external_user_id. Shows all verifications per user. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_verified_user1 of 1 parameter describedGet a single verified user and their verifications by external user ID. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
start_domain_verification3 of 3 parameters describedStart a B2B domain verification. Creates a verification record and returns DNS/HTTP instructions for the customer to complete. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
check_domain_verification1 of 1 parameter describedCheck the status of a pending domain verification. Triggers a DNS/HTTP check and returns the updated status. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
delete_domain_verification1 of 1 parameter describedDelete a domain verification attempt that is not verified (pending, verifying or failed) — nothing is revoked. A verified domain, or one that needs re-verification, is refused with domain_verified: removing it revokes its proofs and every delegation issued from it, which is delete_domain in a start_login session (or the dashboard). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
wait_for_verification2 of 2 parameters describedPoll a verification until it reaches a terminal state (verified, failed, expired, revoked, or cancelled). Uses exponential backoff (2s initial, 1.5x, 30s max) with jitter. A multi-channel verification that lost the race is "cancelled" and one whose proof was withdrawn is "revoked"; both are final, so the wait returns rather than polling on. Before calling this for a challenge you created, make sure your reply text already shows the user what to act on — the link itself, the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox; a link that appeared only in a tool result is one they never saw. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
create_multi_channel_verification7 of 7 parameters describedCreate a multi-channel phone verification: one phone number challenged over several channels at once (OR / first-wins). The first channel the user completes wins, yields a single proof token, and cancels the losing siblings. Exactly one proof is billed, at the winning channel's completion — not one per channel, and nothing at creation. Agent usage: the response includes a `group_id` (format vg_<hex>) and a `channels` array — each block carries a `deep_link` (WhatsApp/Telegram) or an `sms_message` to present to the user — pass the `deep_link` to render_auth_link. A block's `qr_text` is that same link already rendered as QR art, not an alternative address: print it verbatim inside a fenced code block or leave it out. Poll get_multi_channel_verification_status with the group_id to track completion and retrieve the proof token when a channel verifies. The user does not see tool results — most clients fold them away, render_auth_link's output included. Before you wait or poll, put what the user must act on into your own reply text: the link itself (not a sentence announcing it), the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_multi_channel_verification_status1 of 1 parameter describedGet the status of a multi-channel verification group by its group_id. Returns the aggregate status (pending/verified/expired), the winning_channel once one completes, per-channel statuses, and the proof token (with expires_at) when the group is verified. Before calling this for a challenge you created, make sure your reply text already shows the user what to act on — the link itself, the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox; a link that appeared only in a tool result is one they never saw. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
create_verification_request11 of 11 parameters describedCreate a multi-asset verification request. Allows verifying multiple assets (phone, email, domain, social, wallet, account, telegram_bot) in a single flow. Give the recipient the returned verification_url; wait_for_request or get_verification_request then reads its progress until it is completed, expired or cancelled. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_verification_request1 of 1 parameter describedGet a verification request by ID. Returns the request with all its asset verification statuses. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_request_proofs1 of 1 parameter describedGet proof tokens for verified assets in a verification request. Returns proof tokens that can be used for offline verification. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_verification_requests4 of 4 parameters describedList verification requests with optional filters. Returns paginated results. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_request_by_reference1 of 1 parameter describedGet a verification request by its reference ID (your unique identifier). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
cancel_verification_request1 of 1 parameter describedCancel a pending verification request. Only pending requests can be cancelled. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
wait_for_request2 of 2 parameters describedPoll a verification request until it reaches a terminal state (completed, expired, or cancelled). Uses exponential backoff (2s initial, 1.5x, 30s max) with jitter. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
validate_proof2 of 2 parameters describedValidate a proof token online. Checks the token signature, expiry, and revocation status against the server, and optionally that the proof is about the identifier you expect. Public endpoint — no API key required.
get_proof_status1 of 1 parameter describedGet the status of a proof by its public handle (ph_ctl_* / ph_dlg_*) or a verification ID. Returns whether the proof is active, suspended, expired, or revoked — a live proof reads "active". ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
revoke_proof2 of 2 parameters describedRevoke a proof by its public handle (ph_ctl_* / ph_dlg_*) or a verification ID — the same addresses get_proof_status takes. The proof token will no longer validate anywhere: the status endpoint, the public validator, the revocation list and the Token Status List all report it revoked. A domain CONTROL proof (a ph_ctl_* of a domain) also revokes, for good, every delegation issued from it; for a domain you own, every proof of the domain is revoked and the domain needs re-verification. The API key needs proofs:write, plus delegations:write while the revocation reaches live delegations — for a domain you own, any live delegation of the domain, whichever of its handles you name (the refusal names the scope and the count). A handle revoked before the domain was verified again does not reach the new proof: revoke that one by its own handle. Otherwise it revokes the PROOF only — the asset or consent it is about stays. Need a temporary stop? Use pause_proof instead. Cannot be undone. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
pause_proof1 of 1 parameter describedPause a proof by its public handle (ph_ctl_* / ph_dlg_*) or a verification ID — a reversible stop, undone with resume_proof. While paused the proof is invalid: the status endpoint, the public validator and the Token Status List report it suspended; it is deliberately NOT put on the revocation list. Only an active proof can be paused (already_suspended, proof_expired or proof_revoked otherwise). Pausing a delegation (ph_dlg_*) stops a live publisher's tools: an MCP server running the Proof delegation gate refuses its tool calls once its next status check sees the pause (self-refusal). Pausing a domain CONTROL proof hides every delegation issued from it until it is resumed; nothing is revoked. The API key needs proofs:write, plus delegations:write for a ph_dlg_* or while delegations under a control proof are live. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
resume_proof1 of 1 parameter describedResume a proof paused with pause_proof, by the same handle (ph_ctl_* / ph_dlg_*) or verification ID: it validates again everywhere, and a resumed delegation is honoured again by gated publishers on their next status check. Only the paused row flips back — a proof revoked while paused stays revoked, and a handle whose own row is not the paused one answers not_suspended. The API key needs proofs:write, plus delegations:write for a ph_dlg_*. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_revoked_proofsno parametersGet the revocation list for offline proof validation. Returns a signed list of all revoked proof IDs. Reuse a fetched list for up to 5 minutes (its cache lifetime), then fetch it again to see new revocations; if you cannot, its signature stays verifiable offline for 1 hour.
get_proof_token1 of 1 parameter describedGet the current token of a proof you own, by its public ph_ctl_* handle. After a signing-key rotation this is the re-signed token, which replaces any older copy you hold. Each read is audited. A revoked or expired proof answers proof_not_live; a suspended one is still served. The proof of one of the account's own verified assets (a domain, phone or email verified on the account itself) answers owner_session_required here whatever its status (with a live key; a test key gets not_found): this tool sends the API key, and such a token is read by the signed-in owner in the dashboard. A key bound to a sub-account reads only that sub-account's proofs; another's answers not_found. For a delegation (ph_dlg_*) use get_delegation_token or get_delegation instead. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_reissued_proofs3 of 3 parameters describedList your proofs whose token was re-signed at or after an instant, oldest first — what to re-fetch after a signing-key rotation, for example when a webhook was missed. Items are references {proof_id, reissued_at, token_url}, never tokens: pull a ph_ctl_* item with get_proof_token and a ph_dlg_* item with get_delegation_token. Proofs of the account's own verified assets are not listed here (the API key cannot read their tokens); the dashboard shows them. A key bound to a sub-account lists only that sub-account's proofs and the account's delegations. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_delegation_token1 of 1 parameter describedGet the current token of an active delegation by its public ph_dlg_* handle — after a signing-key rotation, the re-signed token to publish in place of the old one. Public endpoint — no API key required, since the token is already published with the delegation. Any handle that is not an active delegation (revoked, suspended, expired or unknown) answers the same not_found.
create_session3 of 4 parameters describedCreate a new phone verification session. Returns deep_link, qr_code (base64 PNG), and qr_text (UTF-8 text QR for terminal display). Sessions provide a hosted verification flow with callbacks. Agent usage: After creating a session, pass the response's `deep_link` to render_auth_link so the user can open or scan it. Never hand `qr_text` to a link renderer — it is that link already rendered as QR art. Print it verbatim inside a fenced code block only when a real terminal needs the QR. On sms the person texts a short code from the number being proven, as in SMS login: `deep_link` is an `sms:` link to our default number with the message pre-filled, so render it the same way, and also show `sms_message` (what they send) with the numbers in `sms_dids` (one per region, each with its own QR), because a person reading on a computer texts from their phone. They get no reply SMS. An SMS proof can still be revoked about a minute after the session completes, if the delayed spoof check finds the sender was not a real mobile line, so before relying on it check it with validate_proof. Then use wait_for_session to poll until the session reaches a terminal state (verified, failed, or expired). The user does not see tool results — most clients fold them away, render_auth_link's output included. Before you wait or poll, put what the user must act on into your own reply text: the link itself (not a sentence announcing it), the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_session1 of 1 parameter describedGet a session by ID. Returns the session status, verification details, and proof token if verified. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
wait_for_session2 of 2 parameters describedPoll a session until it reaches a terminal state (verified, failed, or expired). Uses exponential backoff (2s initial, 1.5x, 30s max) with jitter. Before calling this for a challenge you created, make sure your reply text already shows the user what to act on — the link itself, the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox; a link that appeared only in a tool result is one they never saw. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_my_proofs2 of 2 parameters describedList all verified assets for the authenticated user. Assets are verified identities (phones, emails, domains). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_assets2 of 2 parameters describedDeprecated: use list_my_proofs
get_my_proof1 of 1 parameter describedGet a single verified asset by ID. Returns details including type, value, status, and verification timestamps. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_asset1 of 1 parameter describedDeprecated: use get_my_proof
revoke_my_proof1 of 1 parameter describedRevoke EVERY proof of one of your assets (a phone, email or domain), by its asset id from list_my_proofs — the asset stays on the account. A ph_ctl_* / ph_dlg_* handle is one proof, not an asset: revoke that with revoke_proof. Owner only: sign in with start_login (a connection with only an API key is refused user_session_required — a key revokes a proof with revoke_proof instead), then one code: start_2fa_for_action with action_type revocation_bulk and targets [this asset id], wait_for_2fa, and call again. A phone or email: every proof of that number or address is revoked; signing in with it again issues a fresh proof. A domain you own: every proof of the domain and every delegation issued from it are revoked for good, and the domain needs re-verification — re-verifying does NOT bring the delegations back. Need a temporary stop for a domain proof? Use pause_proof instead. Status-checking verifiers see the revocation within about a minute; signature-only verifiers accept a token until it expires. Cannot be undone. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
revoke_asset1 of 1 parameter describedDeprecated: use revoke_my_proof
get_current_userno parametersGet the signed-in user's account details, plan and settings. Needs a login session: call start_login, then wait_for_login until it reports success. An API key alone cannot read this — for the key's own account use get_self_api_key or get_settings. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
list_auth_sessionsno parametersList the current user's signed-in devices: every session that can still renew, idle ones included. Each shows its channel, user agent and expires_at, which is when the session stops being able to renew (not when its current access token expires). When called via API key, no session is marked is_current. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
revoke_auth_session1 of 1 parameter describedSign out one device (session) by ID. Over a signed-in session it cannot end the current one (that is logout). Over an API key it can end any of the account's sessions. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_usage2 of 2 parameters describedGet usage metrics for the authenticated account. Shows verification counts, API calls, and quota usage. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_platform_summary2 of 2 parameters describedGet a one-call account snapshot: quota with end-of-month projection, request health (pending/completed/expired counts + success rate), per-channel completion rates, approval channel counts, and active API key count. The same data the dashboard home renders. The hitl_channels sub-object requires the hitl:read scope. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_settingsno parametersGet account settings: the outbound webhook endpoint with its event subscriptions, and the default proof lifetime. Branding (name, logo, colour, email theme, support email) belongs to each sub-account: read it with get_sub_account. The webhook signing secret is NOT returned to an API key — the response reports webhook.secret_set instead, and the value is shown only when it is made: in the update_settings response that created or rotated it, or to the owner rotating it on the Webhooks page in the dashboard (https://proof.holdings/webhooks). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
update_settings3 of 3 parameters describedUpdate account settings: the outbound webhook endpoint with its event subscriptions, and the default proof lifetime. Branding belongs to each sub-account: change it with update_sub_account. Setting the first webhook endpoint creates the signing secret and returns it in this response; the value is returned only when this call created or rotated it, so record it then. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
export_data1 of 1 parameter describedExport a complete copy of your account's data (GDPR Articles 15 and 20), or check on one. Owner only: sign in with start_login first (a connection with only an API key is refused user_session_required). The first call starts the export; it is prepared in the background, and the account owner is told by email (or on their login channel) with a link that downloads it only while they are signed in — this tool never returns the data itself. Call again to see whether it is ready: an export already preparing or ready is reported instead of starting another. One new export per 24 hours (no limit while the account is scheduled for deletion); the file is kept for 7 days. Pass export_id to read one export's status. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
search4 of 4 parameters describedPrefix-anchored global account search across six resource buckets (verification_requests, verifications, hitl, confirmations, authorizations, api_keys). Case-sensitive prefix match over indexed plaintext fields only; recipient identifiers are masked. Results are scoped to the authenticated account. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_self_api_keyno parametersGet the calling API key's own redacted metadata (id, name, key_prefix, environment, scopes, last_used_at, revoked_at, created_at) for agent self-inspection. Never returns the key hash or full secret. Requires API-key auth — a JWT session has no single-key context (returns 400 api_key_required). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_api_key_usage2 of 2 parameters describedGet per-API-key usage for a given key id: verification counts by type/channel/status, plus verification-request/confirmation/authorization totals, and attribution context (attribution_cutoff_at, attributed_fraction). The counts cover the key and every key it replaced (api_key.replaced_key_ids). Counts only — no recipient identifiers. Scoped to the authenticated account; an API-key caller may read only its own key. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, or sign in with start_login — either opens this tool — then call this tool again.
get_companyno parametersGet the account company profile: legal name, registration code, country, EU VAT number, billing address and billing email, with the state of the VAT number VIES check. company is null before one is saved. Needs settings:read on an account-wide key; a key bound to one sub-account is refused account_key_required, since this is the account itself. The owner edits it in the dashboard on the Billing page (https://proof.holdings/billing). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_templates1 of 1 parameter describedList the custom message templates of one sub-account, organized by channel and message type. Templates belong to a sub-account, not to the account: profile_id picks it — omitted, a sub-account key lists its own sub-account and an account-wide key the primary sub-account. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_default_templatesno parametersGet the default message templates — one for each channel and message type a message is actually sent for. These are the built-in templates a sub-account sends when it has no custom template of its own. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_template3 of 3 parameters describedGet the template a sub-account sends for a channel and message type: its custom template if set (scope "project"), otherwise the default (scope "default"). The response names the sub-account in profile_id. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
update_template7 of 7 parameters describedCreate or update a sub-account's custom template for a channel and message type, replacing the default for that sub-account only. Name the brand with {{business_name}}: a template spelling out a sub-account's own name is refused (template_hardcoded_name). A template for a channel and message type no message is sent for, or using a variable that message never fills, is still saved, with an entry in `warnings` (template_not_sent / template_variable_not_filled) saying why it will not be sent as written (an API that predates `warnings` omits the field). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
delete_template3 of 3 parameters describedDelete a sub-account's custom template, reverting that sub-account to the default template for the channel and message type. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
preview_template7 of 7 parameters describedPreview a template with sample data before saving, as a sub-account would send it. Shows how the message will look with placeholder variables filled in. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
render_template4 of 4 parameters describedRender the template a sub-account sends — its custom template, otherwise the default — with provided variables. Returns the fully rendered message content. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_webhook_statsno parametersGet webhook delivery statistics including total deliveries, success/failure counts, and recent activity. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_webhook_deliveries7 of 7 parameters describedList webhook delivery attempts with pagination and filtering. Shows delivery status, response codes, and timestamps. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_webhook_delivery1 of 1 parameter describedGet details of a single webhook delivery attempt including request/response payloads and retry history. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
retry_webhook_delivery1 of 1 parameter describedRetry a failed webhook delivery. Creates a new delivery attempt with the same payload to the configured endpoint. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_webhook_endpointsno parametersList the account's webhook endpoints (URL, events, scope, sub-accounts, status). Secrets are never listed. A sub-account key sees only the endpoints scoped to exactly its own sub-account. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_webhook_endpoint1 of 1 parameter describedGet one webhook endpoint by ID. The signing secret is not returned (only create_webhook_endpoint and rotate_webhook_endpoint_secret return it). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
create_webhook_endpoint6 of 6 parameters describedAdd a webhook endpoint. An event reaches every active endpoint whose scope includes the event's sub-account and whose events match; an account-level event reaches "all"-scope endpoints only. An account still delivering to the single webhook URL in its settings is moved onto endpoints by this call (that URL becomes an "all"-scope endpoint with the same secret and events). The response carries the endpoint's signing secret — this and rotate_webhook_endpoint_secret are the only times it is returned, so store it now. Deliveries carry an HMAC-SHA256 X-Proof-Signature over "<X-Proof-Timestamp>.<body>" made with it. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
update_webhook_endpoint7 of 7 parameters describedUpdate a webhook endpoint: its URL, events, scope, sub-accounts, status or description. Every field is optional, but send at least one. Changing the scope to "selected" without profile_ids keeps the stored list. The signing secret is unchanged (rotate it with rotate_webhook_endpoint_secret). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
delete_webhook_endpoint1 of 1 parameter describedDelete a webhook endpoint. It receives no new events; deliveries already queued to it are still attempted, signed with the secret they were queued with. Cannot be undone. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
rotate_webhook_endpoint_secret1 of 1 parameter describedReplace a webhook endpoint's signing secret and return the new one — this and create_webhook_endpoint are the only times a secret is returned, so store it now. New deliveries are signed with the new secret; deliveries already queued keep the secret they were queued with. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_subscriptionno parametersGet the current subscription details including plan, status, billing period, and usage limits. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_balanceno parametersGet the prepaid balance (in euro cents and mills), the low-balance threshold, the top-up amounts on offer and the auto top-up setting. Proofs past the plan's included amount are drawn from this balance; once billing is live, an account whose balance is at or below zero is refused new proof requests (402 balance_empty) until it tops up. billing_enabled says whether billing is live. Topping up and changing auto top-up are done by the owner in the dashboard, on the Billing page (https://proof.holdings/billing). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_balance_ledger2 of 2 parameters describedList the prepaid balance history, newest first: every top-up, refund and adjustment, and one usage row per month for that month's deductions. Amounts are signed euro cents (credits positive). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_sub_accountsno parametersList every sub-account of the authenticated account, the primary one included. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_profilesno parametersDeprecated: use list_sub_accounts
create_sub_account10 of 10 parameters describedCreate a new sub-account with optional display name, bio, avatar, business info, email branding (theme, support email), and theme settings. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
create_profile10 of 10 parameters describedDeprecated: use create_sub_account
get_sub_account1 of 1 parameter describedGet one sub-account by ID, with its full details including theme, custom links, and verification display settings. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_profile1 of 1 parameter describedDeprecated: use get_sub_account
update_sub_account15 of 15 parameters describedUpdate a sub-account by ID. Supports changing display info, email branding (theme, support email), theme, custom links, and verification display settings. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
update_profile15 of 15 parameters describedDeprecated: use update_sub_account
delete_sub_account1 of 1 parameter describedDelete a sub-account. Revokes its API keys, archives the approval channels and declines the pending requests created with its own keys, keeps its history but unlinks it, deletes its message templates, and retires its username for good. The last sub-account cannot be deleted; deleting the primary sub-account makes the oldest remaining one primary (the response names it). In a start_login session: one code first — start_2fa_for_action with action_type profile_delete and targets [this sub-account id]. With an API key alone only an EMPTY sub-account (no API keys, approval channels or pending requests) can be deleted; anything else answers owner_session_required. archive_default_linked is deliberately not offered here: archiving or cancelling everything linked only by default is an irreversible fan-out, so archive each item explicitly instead. Cannot be undone. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, or sign in with start_login — either opens this tool — then call this tool again.
delete_profile1 of 1 parameter describedDeprecated: use delete_sub_account
set_primary_sub_account1 of 1 parameter describedMake a sub-account the primary one. The previous primary sub-account becomes secondary. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
set_primary_profile1 of 1 parameter describedDeprecated: use set_primary_sub_account
update_sub_account_page_proofs3 of 3 parameters describedUpdate which verified assets (proofs) are displayed on one named sub-account. Controls visibility, privacy masking, ordering, and labels. For the primary sub-account in a signed-in session, update_public_page_proofs does the same. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
update_profile_proofs3 of 3 parameters describedDeprecated: use update_sub_account_page_proofs
get_current_sub_accountno parametersGet the current sub-account record: with a sub-account key, that key's own sub-account; otherwise the account's primary sub-account. The first call creates a primary sub-account if the account has none (never for a sub-account key, which gets profile_not_found). Returns profile details, theme, custom links, and public proof display settings. Its write twin is update_public_page (the same record). In the dashboard, the Profile page (https://proof.holdings/profile) edits whichever sub-account is selected there. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_my_profileno parametersDeprecated: use get_current_sub_account
update_public_page9 of 9 parameters describedUpdate the record get_current_sub_account reads: a sub-account key's own sub-account, otherwise the primary sub-account (never creates one). Takes presentation fields only — display name, bio, avatar, theme, custom links, and verification display settings; business details, the primary flag and email branding go through update_sub_account. In the dashboard, the Profile page (https://proof.holdings/profile) edits whichever sub-account is selected there. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
update_my_profile9 of 9 parameters describedDeprecated: use update_public_page
list_public_page_proof_options1 of 1 parameter describedList the verified proofs that can be shown on the Public page (each one eligible to be listed with update_public_page_proofs). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_profile_assets1 of 1 parameter describedDeprecated: use list_public_page_proof_options
rotate_callback_secret1 of 1 parameter describedRotate a sub-account's callback signing secret — the secret that signs every callback_url delivery of its verification requests — and return the new one. This is the only time it is returned, so store it now. Callback deliveries already queued keep the secret they were signed with. An account still delivering through its settings webhook URL is switched over to webhook endpoints first. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
preview_sub_account_deletion1 of 1 parameter describedPreview what delete_sub_account would do to one sub-account, without changing anything: the counts the dashboard Delete sub-account dialog shows and the sub-account that would take its place, or why deletion is refused (allowed: false). Needs profiles:read; a key bound to a sub-account previews only its own. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
preview_profile_deletion1 of 1 parameter describedDeprecated: use preview_sub_account_deletion
list_emailsno parametersList all email addresses associated with the authenticated account. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
remove_email1 of 1 parameter describedRemove an email address from the account. Always requires one code: start_2fa_for_action with action_type email_remove and targets [this email id]. Revokes every proof of the address and your own consents naming it, declines pending confirmations waiting on it, moves Lookalike Watch alerts to your remaining primary email (or stops the watch when none is left), deletes the record, signs out your other devices, and names the new primary email. Refused for the address you signed in with and for your only way to sign in. Cannot be undone. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
set_email_account_access2 of 2 parameters describedTurn Account access on or off for one of the account's email addresses: whether it signs in to the account and confirms its sensitive actions (2FA step-ups). Every new email address starts on. Either direction requires one code: start_2fa_for_action with action_type account_access and targets ["act:access_on", "<id>"] to turn it on or ["act:access_off", "<id>"] to turn it off; without it the call answers 403 2fa_required. Turning off the last way into the account answers 409 last_account_access. Turning it off ends the sign-in sessions this address opened within 15 minutes (at their next renewal) and signs out no other device; MCP sign-ins and API keys are not sessions and are not affected. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
set_primary_email1 of 1 parameter describedSet an email address as the primary email for the account. Always requires one code: start_2fa_for_action with action_type email_primary (no targets); without it the call answers 403 2fa_required. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
start_add_email1 of 1 parameter describedStart adding a new email address. Sends an OTP code to the email. Returns a session ID: when the user has the code, pass it with that session ID to verify_email_otp (resend_email_otp if it did not arrive; get_add_email_status reads the session). ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
get_add_email_status1 of 1 parameter describedCheck the status of an in-progress email addition by session ID. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
verify_email_otp2 of 2 parameters describedSubmit the OTP code to verify an email addition. Completes the add-email flow if the code is correct. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
resend_email_otp1 of 1 parameter describedResend the OTP code for an in-progress email addition. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
preview_email_removal1 of 1 parameter describedPreview what remove_email would do to one email address, without changing anything: the counts the dashboard Remove dialog shows, or the reason removal would be refused. Needs a signed-in session, like remove_email. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
list_phonesno parametersList all phone numbers associated with the authenticated account. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
remove_phone1 of 1 parameter describedRemove a phone number from the account. Always requires one code: start_2fa_for_action with action_type phone_remove and targets [this phone id]. Revokes every proof of the number and your own consents naming it, declines pending confirmations waiting on it, flags approval setups left with no approver, deletes the record and its messenger links, signs out your other devices, and names the new primary phone — your Proof of Me circles then reach you there. Refused for the number you signed in with, for your only way to sign in, and for your last phone while circles are active (circles_need_phone: add another phone first, or archive the circles). Cannot be undone. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
set_phone_account_access2 of 2 parameters describedTurn Account access on or off for one of the account's phone numbers: whether it signs in to the account and confirms its sensitive actions (2FA step-ups). Every new phone number starts on. Either direction requires one code: start_2fa_for_action with action_type account_access and targets ["act:access_on", "<id>"] to turn it on or ["act:access_off", "<id>"] to turn it off; without it the call answers 403 2fa_required. Turning off the last way into the account answers 409 last_account_access. Turning it off ends the sign-in sessions this number opened within 15 minutes (at their next renewal) and signs out no other device; MCP sign-ins and API keys are not sessions and are not affected. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
set_primary_phone1 of 1 parameter describedSet a phone number as the primary phone for the account. Always requires one code: start_2fa_for_action with action_type phone_primary (no targets); without it the call answers 403 2fa_required. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
start_add_phone1 of 1 parameter describedStart adding a new phone number by reverse OTP: the user starts the exchange themselves and nothing is sent before they do; the response's `instructions` field says what they do (on telegram the bot then asks them to tap a button that shares their number). Returns a session ID; on telegram/whatsapp also deep_link, qr_code (base64 PNG) and qr_text (UTF-8 text QR), and on sms sms_message and sms_dids (one entry per region; a region with no number configured has an empty `did`) with no deep_link. Agent usage: on telegram/whatsapp pass `deep_link` to render_auth_link for the link and a QR code. On sms there is no deep_link — show `sms_message` and a number from an `sms_dids` entry whose `did` is non-empty. Never hand a `qr_text` to a link renderer — it is a link already rendered as QR art. Then poll get_add_phone_status with the session ID. The user does not see tool results — most clients fold them away, render_auth_link's output included. Before you wait or poll, put what the user must act on into your own reply text: the link itself (not a sentence announcing it), the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
get_add_phone_status1 of 1 parameter describedCheck the status of an in-progress phone addition by session ID. Poll until terminal state. Before calling this for a challenge you created, make sure your reply text already shows the user what to act on — the link itself, the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox; a link that appeared only in a tool result is one they never saw. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
preview_phone_removal1 of 1 parameter describedPreview what remove_phone would do to one phone, without changing anything: the counts the dashboard Remove dialog shows, or the reason removal would be refused. Needs a signed-in session, like remove_phone. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
list_api_keysno parametersList all API keys for the authenticated account. Returns key metadata (not the secret key values). ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
create_api_key5 of 5 parameters describedCreate a new API key. The secret key value is returned ONLY in this response — store it securely. Note: the secret will be visible in the AI conversation context. Optionally bind the key to a sub-account via profile_id — outbound messages sent with the key are then branded as that sub-account. Optionally give it an end date with expires_at (ISO 8601 with offset, at least 5 minutes ahead); leave it out and the key never expires. Ask the user when the key should stop working rather than choosing for them. A date in the past or less than 5 minutes ahead is refused (validation_error) and nothing is created. Agent usage: This operation requires 2FA bound to the key it creates — its environment, scopes, sub-account and end date: a code confirmed for one key does not create another. (1) Call create_api_key with what the user chose; nothing is created, and its 2fa_required refusal lists the exact targets for that key. (2) Call start_2fa with action_type "api_key_create" and exactly those targets (none if the refusal lists none); the user is shown the key they are approving. (3) Wait for the user to verify the code and poll get_2fa_status until "verified". (4) Call create_api_key again with the SAME arguments. One code creates one key. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
revoke_api_key1 of 1 parameter describedRevoke an API key by ID. The key will immediately stop working. This action cannot be undone. Agent usage: This operation requires 2FA. Before calling, complete the 2FA flow: (1) call start_2fa with action_type "api_key_revoke", (2) wait for user to verify the code, (3) poll get_2fa_status until "verified", (4) then call revoke_api_key. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
regenerate_api_key2 of 2 parameters describedRegenerate an API key: issues a new key (a new id and secret) with the same name, environment, scopes and sub-account. Pass expires_at to choose when the new key stops working — a date, or null for never; leave it out and the new key keeps the old key's end date (or none). Ask the user rather than choosing. The answer's expires_at is when the new key stops working (carried from the old key when you send none); with no expires_at the new key never expires. A key whose expires_at has passed (see list_api_keys) is refused (api_key_expired) and a new date does not revive it, so check it before starting 2FA: for a key an MCP sign-in minted the message reads "This key stopped working on <day> and can't be turned back on. Connect your AI client again to get a new one."; for any other key, "This key stopped working on <day> and can't be turned back on. Create a new key." The old key stops working immediately; use the id in this response from now on. The new key lists the old one in replaced_key_ids, so its requests and usage stay with it. The new secret is returned ONLY in this response. Note: the secret will be visible in the AI conversation context. Agent usage: This operation requires 2FA bound to this key and to the end date sent (none sent, a date, and null are three different confirmations). (1) Call regenerate_api_key with the end date the user chose, or none; its 2fa_required refusal lists the exact targets — ["<this key id>"] with no expires_at, ["<this key id>", "act:expires_at:<the instant as UTC ISO 8601 with milliseconds>"] for a date, "act:expires_at:never" for null. (2) Call start_2fa with action_type "api_key_regenerate" and exactly those targets; the user is shown the new end date (or "never") they are approving. (3) Wait for the user to verify the code and poll get_2fa_status until "verified". (4) Call regenerate_api_key again with the SAME expires_at. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
set_api_key_expiry2 of 2 parameters describedChange when an API key stops working: set an end date on a key that has none, move it earlier or later, or pass expires_at null so the key never expires. The key keeps its id, secret, scopes and sub-account; only the date changes, and nothing extends it later. Answers the key as list_api_keys shows it. Refused before any 2FA code is asked for: a key that is not one of the account's live keys (not_found); a key whose expires_at has passed (api_key_expired — it cannot be revived, create a new key instead); a key an MCP sign-in renews itself (api_key_managed_by_sign_in — list_api_keys shows managed_by_sign_in: true; the user disconnects the AI client to end it). Check list_api_keys first so you do not start 2FA for a refused change. Agent usage: This operation requires 2FA bound to this key AND this exact value, shortening included: a code confirmed for one date does not set another date or "never". (1) Call set_api_key_expiry with the value the user chose; its 2fa_required refusal lists the exact targets — ["<this key id>", "act:expires_at:<the instant as UTC ISO 8601 with milliseconds, e.g. 2027-02-09T14:59:59.999Z>"], or "act:expires_at:never" for null. (2) Call start_2fa with action_type "api_key_expiry" and exactly those targets; the user is shown the date (or "never") they are approving. (3) Wait for the user to verify the code and poll get_2fa_status until "verified". (4) Call set_api_key_expiry again with the SAME value. One code covers one change. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
start_2fa7 of 7 parameters describedStart a two-factor authentication challenge for a sensitive operation. Sends a verification code via the chosen channel. Returns a session ID, and for messaging channels: deep_link, qr_code (base64 PNG), and qr_text (UTF-8 text QR for terminal display). Agent usage — full 2FA flow: (1) Call start_2fa with the appropriate action_type and channel. (2) Present the challenge, and do NOT announce a message the server did not send: email is the ONLY channel it dispatches on. On telegram/whatsapp the user opens `deep_link` and sends the message themselves; on sms they send `sms_message` to a number from `sms_dids`; the response's own `instructions` field says which. On email, a 200 carrying `requires_email_selection: true` and `available_emails` means nothing was sent and no session exists — ask which address and call again with `email_id`. For telegram/whatsapp, pass `deep_link` to render_auth_link; for sms, show `sms_message`. Never hand `qr_text` to a link renderer — it is the link already rendered as QR art, so print it verbatim inside a fenced code block only when a real terminal needs the QR. (3) Poll get_2fa_status with the returned session_id until status is "verified" (the user enters the code on their device) or "expired". (4) If verified, proceed with the protected operation (e.g. create_api_key). If expired, inform the user and offer to restart. Typical channels: "telegram" or "email". For email, the user may receive a magic link instead of a code — the backend handles this automatically. The user does not see tool results — most clients fold them away, render_auth_link's output included. Before you wait or poll, put what the user must act on into your own reply text: the link itself (not a sentence announcing it), the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
get_2fa_status1 of 1 parameter describedCheck the status of a 2FA session by session ID. Returns whether the challenge has been completed, is pending, or has expired. Agent usage: Poll this after calling start_2fa. Check every few seconds. Terminal states: "verified" (proceed with protected operation), "expired" (restart with start_2fa). While "pending", the user has not yet entered their code. Before calling this for a challenge you created, make sure your reply text already shows the user what to act on — the link itself, the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox; a link that appeared only in a tool result is one they never saw. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
verify_2fa2 of 2 parameters describedSubmit a verification code to complete a 2FA challenge. Rate limited to 10 attempts per minute. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
verify_2fa_magic_link1 of 1 parameter describedComplete a 2FA challenge using a magic link token (received via email). No code submission needed — the token itself is the proof. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
wait_for_2fa2 of 2 parameters describedPoll a 2FA session until the user completes the challenge. Uses exponential backoff (2s initial, 1.5x, 30s max) with jitter. Agent usage: Call this after start_2fa with the returned session_id. Terminal states: "verified" (challenge completed — proceed with the protected operation), "expired" (offer to restart with start_2fa). Before polling, present start_2fa's challenge: pass its `deep_link` to render_auth_link on telegram/whatsapp, or show its `sms_message` on sms. The user does not see tool results — most clients fold them away, render_auth_link's output included. Before you wait or poll, put what the user must act on into your own reply text: the link itself (not a sentence announcing it), the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_domainsno parametersList all domains for the authenticated account. Returns domain metadata including verification status. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
add_domain4 of 4 parameters describedAdd a new domain to verify ownership. Optionally specify email sending intent and verification method. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
get_domain1 of 1 parameter describedGet details of a specific domain by ID, including verification status, DNS records, and provider connections. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
delete_domain1 of 1 parameter describedRemove a domain from the account. Revokes every proof of the domain and every delegation issued from it (for good — re-adding the domain does not bring them back), deletes the domain and its records, and removes our _proof TXT record and the Resend sending domain where we can; the response lists what is left for you to remove by hand. Owner only, in a start_login session, with one code: start_2fa_for_action with action_type domain_remove and targets [this domain id]. Need only a fresh proof? Revoke the proofs instead (revoke_my_proof), which keeps the domain. Cannot be undone. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
verify_domain1 of 1 parameter describedTrigger domain verification. Checks DNS records or other verification method to confirm domain ownership. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
connect_cloudflare2 of 2 parameters describedConnect a Cloudflare API token to a domain: the server publishes the verification record through it. The domain is verified once that record is live in public DNS — often at once, else status "verifying" while the server keeps checking (call get_domain). Note: the API token will be visible in the AI conversation context. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
connect_godaddy4 of 4 parameters describedConnect GoDaddy credentials to a domain: a Personal Access Token (api_token, permissions domains.domain:read and domains.dns:update), or a Production API key with its secret. The server publishes the verification record through it; the domain is verified once that record is live in public DNS — often at once, else status "verifying" while the server keeps checking (call get_domain). Note: the credentials will be visible in the AI conversation context. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
connect_dns_provider3 of 3 parameters describedConnect a generic DNS provider to a domain using provider-specific credentials. The server publishes the verification record through it; the domain is verified once that record is live in public DNS — often at once, else status "verifying" while the server keeps checking (call get_domain). Note: credentials will be visible in the AI conversation context. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
add_verification_provider3 of 3 parameters describedAdd an additional DNS provider for verification to an already-verified domain. Note: credentials will be visible in the AI conversation context. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
get_dns_providersno parametersGet metadata for all supported DNS providers, including required credential fields and documentation links. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
verify_domain_with_credentials1 of 1 parameter describedPublish a pending domain's verification record using previously stored DNS credentials. The domain is verified once that record is live in public DNS — often at once, else status "verifying" while the server keeps checking (call get_domain). Use when credentials are already connected. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
check_domain_credentials1 of 1 parameter describedCheck if stored DNS credentials have access to a domain. Use before triggering verification to confirm the credentials work. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
start_domain_email_verification2 of 2 parameters describedStart domain verification via corporate email. Sends a verification code to a standard admin email address at the domain. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
confirm_domain_email_code2 of 2 parameters describedConfirm domain email verification by submitting the code sent to the corporate email address. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
resend_domain_email2 of 2 parameters describedResend the domain verification email. Rate limited to 3 requests per minute. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
setup_domain_email2 of 2 parameters describedRegister a verified domain with Proof's email provider (Resend) for sending. The result carries the DKIM/SPF DNS records to publish (`resend.dkim_records`) and their status. `from_email`, if given, must be on this domain and is stored as the preferred sender. Proof does not send from customer domains yet: verification emails still come from Proof's own address, and the stored `from_email` is not used. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
check_domain_email_status1 of 1 parameter describedCheck the email sending setup status for a domain, including DNS record configuration progress. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
list_dns_credentialsno parametersList all stored DNS provider credentials for the authenticated account. Returns credential metadata (not secret values). ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
create_dns_credential2 of 2 parameters describedStore DNS provider credentials for automated domain verification. Note: credentials will be visible in the AI conversation context. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
delete_dns_credential1 of 1 parameter describedDelete a stored DNS provider credential. Domains using this credential will need new credentials for automated verification. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
list_my_requests2 of 2 parameters describedList verification requests created by the authenticated user. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, or sign in with start_login — either opens this tool — then call this tool again.
list_incoming_requestsno parametersList incoming verification requests where the authenticated user is the subject. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
create_user_request10 of 10 parameters describedCreate a new verification request to ask another user to share verified assets; list_my_requests shows its progress and cancel_user_request withdraws it. Each asset is an object naming its type, e.g. { "type": "email" }. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
cancel_user_request1 of 1 parameter describedCancel a pending verification request. Only the creator can cancel. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
extend_request2 of 2 parameters describedExtend the expiration time of a pending verification request. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
share_request_email2 of 2 parameters describedEmail the link of a pending verification request to a recipient. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
start_user_domain_verification2 of 2 parameters describedStart a self-service domain verification session. The user proves ownership of a domain via DNS or HTTP challenge. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
get_user_domain_verification_status1 of 1 parameter describedGet the current status of a domain verification session, including challenge details. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
check_user_domain_verification1 of 1 parameter describedTrigger a check on the domain verification challenge. Call after placing DNS record or HTTP file. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
claim_username2 of 2 parameters describedClaim a unique username for the authenticated user's Public page. Usernames must be 3-30 characters, alphanumeric and underscores only. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
update_public_page_proofs2 of 2 parameters describedUpdate which verified proofs are visible on the public page of the primary sub-account (the one get_current_sub_account reads), including visibility, masking, and display order. Needs a signed-in session. To do the same for a named sub-account, use update_sub_account_page_proofs. ACCESS: needs a Proof account, signed in: call start_login, show the user its challenge, then wait_for_login, then call this tool again. An API key alone does NOT open this tool.
update_public_proofs2 of 2 parameters describedDeprecated: use update_public_page_proofs
create_authorization9 of 9 parameters describedCreate a new authorization request. Authorizations grant permission to send confirmations to a user via a specific channel. The user must approve the authorization before confirmations can be sent; get_authorization reads its status, which stays pending until they answer. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_authorization1 of 1 parameter describedGet an authorization by ID. Returns the current state of the authorization including status and usage statistics. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_authorizations5 of 5 parameters describedList authorizations with optional filters. Returns paginated results. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
revoke_authorization2 of 2 parameters describedRevoke an active or pending authorization. Only authorizations with status "active" or "pending" can be revoked. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
export_authorizations4 of 4 parameters describedExport authorizations as CSV or JSON. Supports date range and status filtering. Maximum 10,000 records. CSV comes back as `{ content_type, body, truncated }` with the file in `body`; a body over 100,000 characters is cut at the last full line (`truncated: true`, `total_chars`) — narrow `from`/`to` or `status` and export again for the rest. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
create_confirmation3 of 3 parameters describedCreate a HITL confirmation request. Sends an approval request to the channels configured on the referenced approval channel. First response wins. Agent usage: The approval channel referenced by hitl_id must be authorized before you can create confirmations. If this returns a 403 or "not authorized" error, call request_approval_channel_authorization on the approval channel first, then wait for the user to approve via the messaging channel. After creating a confirmation, poll get_confirmation to check for approval/denial, or, if the user (the approval channel owner) will decide it themselves, use get_confirmation_approval_link for their own approval link. Encryption is NOT optional: an approval channel cannot send confirmations without a keypair (protected by the owner's approvals password, set in the dashboard under Settings → Approvals password, https://proof.holdings/dev), the human approves by decrypting in their browser, and `message` must be a JSON ciphertext envelope. Plaintext is refused with 400 `message_not_encrypted`; an envelope sealed to another key with 400 `message_key_mismatch`. Choose the version by who must be able to decrypt: - v1 (single-recipient): wraps the content key for the config owner only. Use ONLY when there are no enrolled non-owner approvers — with approvers enrolled it is refused with 400 `envelope_missing_approvers`. - v2 (multi-recipient): additionally wraps the content key for each enrolled approver via an `approver_ek` map, so every approver can decrypt. Build it with the SDK `encryptMessageV2(plaintext, ownerPublicKey, hitlId, approverKeys)` after fetching the approvers via the SDK `getApproverKeys(hitlId)` (`GET /api/v1/hitl/:id/approver-keys`). AAD is the `hitlId`. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_confirmation1 of 1 parameter describedGet a confirmation by ID. Returns the full confirmation including status, response, and proof token. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_confirmations7 of 7 parameters describedList confirmations with optional filters. Returns paginated results with status, approval channel and sub-account (profile_id) filtering. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_confirmation_approval_link1 of 1 parameter describedGet the approval link of the approval channel owner: it is decided with the config's own key, so it is for the owner to approve or deny the confirmation themselves. An approver cannot use it — an approver's link goes only to their own channel, and "Send again" (`POST /api/v1/confirmations/{id}/resend`, which no tool calls yet) is what sends it there again. Every call returns the same owner link until "Send again" reaches the owner; "Send again" replaces it, and the next call returns a new one. Calling this tool again cancels nothing, so it is safe to call again to show the link again. The link expires when the confirmation does. Only works for pending confirmations. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
wait_for_confirmation2 of 2 parameters describedPoll a confirmation until the approver responds. Uses exponential backoff (2s initial, 1.5x, 30s max) with jitter. Agent usage: Call this after create_confirmation with the returned confirmation ID. Terminal states: "approved" (action authorized — check the proof_token), "denied" (action rejected). While "pending", the approver has not yet responded. This poll returns no link — the approval request is delivered to the approver's own channel, and only the owner's "Send again" (`POST /api/v1/confirmations/{id}/resend`, which no tool calls yet) delivers it there again. If the owner will decide instead, call get_confirmation_approval_link for the owner's `approval_url`; it needs the confirmation to be still pending — the state this tool waits in — and also refuses once `timeout_at` has passed, so a long wait can outlive the link even while the status has not moved. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
resend_confirmation1 of 1 parameter describedSend a pending confirmation again to the people it went to: each recipient gets a fresh link bound to them, through their own channel, expiring when the confirmation does; their earlier links stop working (410 approval_link_superseded). The response carries counts only, never a link. Recipients are the approvers whose authorization is still active and whose key the stored message is encrypted for, plus the owner; an approver added since needs a new confirmation. A charged send, like create_confirmation: an account past its included proofs with an empty prepaid balance is refused with 402 balance_empty, whose top_up_url is the Billing page (https://proof.holdings/billing). Refused 400 invalid_status once decided, expired, or config_archived. Read the decision with get_confirmation, or wait_for_confirmation. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
create_approval_channel5 of 5 parameters describedCreate a HITL (Human-in-the-Loop) config. Defines which messaging channels receive approval requests and the default timeout. Agent usage: After creating an approval channel, you must call request_approval_channel_authorization before it can be used with create_confirmation. For Telegram channels, use create_chat_id_discovery first to discover the user's chat ID, then include it in the channel config. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
create_hitl5 of 5 parameters describedDeprecated: use create_approval_channel
get_approval_channel1 of 1 parameter describedGet an approval channel by ID. Returns the config including channels, timeout, and status. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_hitl1 of 1 parameter describedDeprecated: use get_approval_channel
list_approval_channels5 of 5 parameters describedList approval channels with optional filters. Returns paginated results. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_hitls5 of 5 parameters describedDeprecated: use list_approval_channels
update_approval_channel4 of 4 parameters describedUpdate an approval channel. Can change name, channels, or timeout. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
update_hitl4 of 4 parameters describedDeprecated: use update_approval_channel
archive_approval_channel1 of 1 parameter describedDelete (archive) an approval channel. Sets status to archived. Cannot be used for new confirmations after deletion. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
delete_hitl1 of 1 parameter describedDeprecated: use archive_approval_channel
request_approval_channel_authorization1 of 1 parameter describedRequest authorization for an approval channel. Sends consent requests to all configured channels (Telegram/WhatsApp). Users must approve before confirmations can be sent. Agent usage: This must be completed before create_confirmation will work for this approval channel. The consent request is DELIVERED to each channel — the response carries no link to show. It returns `authorizations` — one entry per resolved recipient, each with its `channel`, `recipient`, `authorization_id` and `status` — plus a `message`. Read the entries rather than assuming: `status: 'pending'` means consent was just sent and the user must approve in Telegram/WhatsApp itself, while `status: 'active'` means that recipient had already authorized and nothing was sent to them. An EMPTY array does not mean everyone is authorized — it means no recipient could be resolved at all (usually an approval channel bound to a missing or inactive circle, or channels whose recipient is blank), so nobody was asked and waiting for an approval would hang forever. Do not relay `message` on that branch: it reads 'All channels already have active or pending authorizations', which is exactly the wrong conclusion. Read the array. After requesting, you can proceed once the user confirms they have approved; get_authorization with an entry's authorization_id reads whether it has turned active. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
request_hitl_authorization1 of 1 parameter describedDeprecated: use request_approval_channel_authorization
create_chat_id_discoveryno parametersCreate a Telegram chat ID discovery token. Returns a deep_link, qr_code (base64 PNG), and qr_text (UTF-8 text QR for terminal display). The user opens the link in Telegram, which reveals their chat ID for approval channel setup. Agent usage: pass the response's `deep_link` to render_auth_link so the user can click or scan it. Never hand `qr_text` to a link renderer — it is that same link already rendered as QR art. Print it verbatim inside a fenced code block only when a real terminal needs the QR. Then poll poll_chat_id_discovery with the returned token until the chat_id appears. Use the discovered chat_id when creating an approval channel with a Telegram channel. The user does not see tool results — most clients fold them away, render_auth_link's output included. Before you wait or poll, put what the user must act on into your own reply text: the link itself (not a sentence announcing it), the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
poll_chat_id_discovery1 of 1 parameter describedPoll a chat ID discovery token. Returns the discovered Telegram chat ID, user ID, and username once the user interacts with the bot. Before calling this for a challenge you created, make sure your reply text already shows the user what to act on — the link itself, the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox; a link that appeared only in a tool result is one they never saw. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
wait_for_chat_id_discovery2 of 2 parameters describedPoll a chat ID discovery token until the user interacts with the Telegram bot. Uses exponential backoff (2s initial, 1.5x, 30s max) with jitter. Agent usage: Call this after create_chat_id_discovery. Present the discovery response's `deep_link` with render_auth_link first, then poll with the returned token. Terminal states: "completed" (chat_id discovered — use it when creating an approval channel with a Telegram channel), "expired". While "pending", the user has not yet opened the Telegram link. The user does not see tool results — most clients fold them away, render_auth_link's output included. Before you wait or poll, put what the user must act on into your own reply text: the link itself (not a sentence announcing it), the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_approval_channel_keys1 of 1 parameter describedGet the encryption keypair for an approval channel. With `hitl:read` it returns the public key, encrypted private key, KDF salt, and key ID (kid). A key holding `confirmations:create` without `hitl:read` receives only `public_key` and `kid` — what a confirmation message is sealed to, never the private-key material. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_hitl_keys1 of 1 parameter describedDeprecated: use get_approval_channel_keys
upload_approval_channel_keys10 of 10 parameters describedUpload an encryption keypair for an approval channel. The server validates the RSA-4096 public key and computes the key ID. Note: the encrypted_private_key is already encrypted client-side with the user's password — the server never sees the password. The owner sets that password in the dashboard under Settings → Approvals password (https://proof.holdings/dev). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
upload_hitl_keys10 of 10 parameters describedDeprecated: use upload_approval_channel_keys
delete_approval_channel_keys1 of 1 parameter describedDelete the encryption keypair from an approval channel. WARNING: Existing ciphertexts will become permanently unreadable. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
delete_hitl_keys1 of 1 parameter describedDeprecated: use delete_approval_channel_keys
create_identity_challenge3 of 3 parameters describedCreate a Proof of Me cross-channel identity challenge (CONFIRM) for an enrolled Circle member. The account holder approves/denies on a channel different from the one the suspicious contact reached the member on. Agent usage: poll get_identity_challenge with the returned ID until it leaves pending (confirmed, denied, cancelled, failed, expired or revoked). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_identity_challenge1 of 1 parameter describedGet a Proof of Me identity challenge by ID. Returns its status (pending, confirmed, denied, cancelled, failed, expired, revoked or suspended), the channel the CONFIRM ran on, and — once the person being checked decided — the proof token and its proof_id. Poll this for resolution. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
create_circle5 of 5 parameters describedCreate a Circle — a named group of trusted contacts (the people-primitive powering Proof of Me and Approvals-on-Circle). Optionally seed initial members; each member's declared channels are stored so they can be invited to enroll. Agent usage: after creating a Circle, add members with add_circle_member (or seed them here), then invite_circle_member to mint the enrollment deep link each contact taps to bind their messenger identity. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_circles5 of 5 parameters describedList Circles with optional filters. Archived Circles are excluded by default; pass status="archived" to surface them. Returns paginated results. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_circle1 of 1 parameter describedGet a Circle by ID. Returns the Circle including its members and per-member channel presence booleans (an identifier is NEVER returned — SEC-PM-006). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
update_circle3 of 3 parameters describedUpdate a Circle's name and/or owner name. Omitted fields are left unchanged; the sub-account and identity binding is set at creation only. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
delete_circle1 of 1 parameter describedArchive a Circle (soft delete — sets status to archived). It stops appearing in the default list but is recoverable via list_circles with status="archived". ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
add_circle_member3 of 3 parameters describedAdd a pending member to a Circle by name, with an optional pre-declared WhatsApp phone. The Telegram chat id is captured later when the member taps the enrollment deep link. Agent usage: after adding a member, call invite_circle_member to mint the single-use enrollment link the member taps to bind their messenger identity. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_circle_members1 of 1 parameter describedList a Circle's members. Each member carries channel-presence booleans (has_telegram / has_whatsapp) and the masked phone they enrolled from (enrolled_phone_hint, e.g. +9••••••4171) — a full identifier is NEVER returned (SEC-PM-006). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
invite_circle_member2 of 2 parameters describedMint a single-use enrollment invite for a Circle member. Returns Telegram + WhatsApp deep links and a QR code; the member taps the channel-matched link to bind their messenger identity to the Circle. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
create_circle_member_drill2 of 2 parameters describedFire an on-demand Proof of Me drill against one enrolled member — a real cross-channel identity challenge carrying the scheduled-safety-check label (the account owner practices confirming). Complements the automated daily drill + monthly reinforcement sweeps. On Pay as you go a live key is refused `422 plan_upgrade_required`; a test key is not, and its drill reaches the member on Telegram only (`400 no_channel` when they have no verified Telegram channel). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
remove_circle_member2 of 2 parameters describedRemove a member from a Circle. Deletes the member's channels and revokes any live authorizations that routed through them. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
add_circle_member_channel4 of 4 parameters describedDeclare a channel for a Circle member. Returns 409 if that channel type already exists on the member. The identifier is a Telegram chat id or an E.164 WhatsApp phone (per-channel format validated server-side). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_circle_member_channels2 of 2 parameters describedList a Circle member's channels. Returns channel metadata only (channel, status, verified_at) — an identifier is NEVER returned (SEC-PM-006). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
remove_circle_member_channel3 of 3 parameters describedRemove a channel from a Circle member. Removing the last channel is allowed (the member simply becomes unreachable). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
create_delegation3 of 3 parameters describedCreate a delegation (Proof of Delegation): a control-proven domain authorizes a typed url/purl artifact and receives a publishable signed token. The attestation is that the domain's controller authorized this artifact — nothing more; it says nothing about the artifact or the business behind it. Each mint is a billable proof. A requested lifetime longer than the control proof's remainder is rejected, never truncated. The result carries the publishable token AND the DERIVED effective_status/is_valid — the same pair the list and get tools return, so the shape does not depend on which verb produced it. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_delegations4 of 4 parameters describedList your own delegations with optional filters. Each item carries the DERIVED effective_status/is_valid beside its stored status — read effective_status, since status records only whether the owner revoked the delegation themselves, so a delegation still reads active there after its domain control proof was revoked, suspended or expired, and after its OWN lifetime ran out. effective_status accounts for all of those: it reports expired once either lifetime has passed, whichever is earlier. Tokens are not included in the list — use get_delegation for the stored token. There is no public enumeration of third-party delegations. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_delegation1 of 1 parameter describedGet one of your delegations by Mongo id or ph_dlg_* handle. Returns the stored publishable token plus the DERIVED effective_status/is_valid — the delegation is only as live as the control proof it stands on (a revoked, suspended or expired domain proof invalidates it) and never outlives its own expires_at, whichever comes first. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
revoke_delegation2 of 2 parameters describedRevoke ONE delegation. The domain control proof and sibling delegations stay valid; the revocation is mirrored into the proof registry so the CRL, status list and public status lookup all see it. Idempotent: a repeat revoke answers success with the same body, both here and through revoke_proof with the ph_dlg_ handle — unlike a PROOF, where a repeat answers already_revoked. The result carries the DERIVED effective_status/is_valid beside the stored status. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_delegation_carriers1 of 1 parameter describedReport where a delegation is still visible to a third party, which matters after a revocation: the _mcp.<principal> DNS pointer and, for a url delegate, a direct card fetch. Takes the delegation id or its ph_dlg_* handle; the same read scope as get_delegation (delegations:read), with no revoked-only gate. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
subscribe_lookalike_watch3 of 3 parameters describedTurn on Lookalike Watch: newly published npm, PyPI, Packagist, Go module and MCP-registry artifacts are watched for names confusable with your brand tokens, with alerts and a monthly report (list_lookalike_alerts, list_lookalike_reports). Not a billed proof: no quota is charged. Lookalike Watch is part of the €29 plan and above (enforced while billing is live). Refused 422 when not eligible, with the reason as the code: plan_upgrade_required, no_verified_domain, no_active_delegation, delegation_sample_exhausted, account_scheduled_for_deletion, or for the delivery address notify_email_not_owned / no_notify_email; 409 when already on; 503 eligibility_unavailable means unknown, not no, so retry. Needs lookalike-watch:write on an account-wide key (a key bound to one sub-account is refused). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
get_lookalike_watchno parametersGet the Lookalike Watch subscription, in the shape subscribe_lookalike_watch returned it. 404 when the account never subscribed. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
cancel_lookalike_watchno parametersTurn Lookalike Watch off. The subscription is kept as canceled and returned in the same shape get_lookalike_watch reads; past alerts and reports stay readable. 404 when not subscribed. Needs lookalike-watch:write on an account-wide key. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_lookalike_alerts2 of 2 parameters describedList Lookalike Watch alerts, newest first: artifacts whose names resemble one of your brand tokens, with the evidence for each. A caller who never subscribed gets an empty page, not a 404. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
list_lookalike_reports2 of 2 parameters describedList the monthly Lookalike Watch reports, newest first. A month with no alerts still has a report, carrying the per-source coverage figures. A caller who never subscribed gets an empty page, not a 404. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
verify_delegation5 of 5 parameters describedVerify a Proof of Delegation — the attestation that a domain authorized a specific agent artifact. Pass either the artifact's card (MCP server.json / A2A agent card) or a raw delegation token, PLUS two facts you established yourself: the artifact identity you resolved (the package you are installing, the endpoint you are calling) and the domain you expect to stand behind it. Both are required — a token can be copied into someone else's card, and any domain owner can mint a valid delegation naming someone else's package, so a verdict without both pins would mean 'some domain said something about some artifact'. WHERE THE IDENTITY MAY COME FROM: it is the artifact you are acting on, and never a value read from inside the artifact you are checking. A name in the artifact's own package.json, card or manifest is self-declared and editable by whoever ships it, so checking it against the delegation compares the artifact with itself. Resolve it afresh at call time instead of reusing a value from earlier in this conversation, which may already be stale. When no independently resolvable identity exists — a local or unpublished artifact — you have nothing to compare against, and that is the honest answer: report it rather than a mismatch, because a mismatch here reads as an accusation against the domain named in the delegation. The verifier walks signature → principal → delegate → revocation status, including the cascade down to the domain control proof. Requires no API key. What a verified result means: the expected domain's controller authorized this artifact — NOT that the artifact is safe, audited or endorsed.
verify_delegations1 of 1 parameter describedBatch-verify up to 50 Proof of Delegation artifacts in one call — the inventory half of the checker (h-proof-checker-mcp): re-check everything you already trust instead of one verify_delegation call per artifact. Each item takes the same shape verify_delegation requires (card XOR token, delegate, expected_principal) and follows the same rule about where identity comes from: each `delegate` is the artifact you are acting on, never a value read from inside the artifact you are checking, and resolved afresh at call time. Items are verified INDEPENDENTLY — no cross-item state, nothing persisted, one item failing never affects another item's result. This tool does NOT discover what you have installed and does NOT fetch anything on your behalf: it verifies material you already hold, the same trust boundary verify_delegation draws. Revocation is always checked (there is no check_status:false here — the point of a batch re-check is to see what changed since you last looked). Each result carries an `outcome`: confirmed_valid (verified), confirmed_invalid (a genuine negative verdict — revoked, expired, mismatched, malformed, and similar), no_claim_found (the artifact publishes no delegation at all — an absence, never an accusation), or unconfirmed (we could not reach the issuer or otherwise get a confident answer right now — NEVER treat this as a bad verdict). Requires no API key. `checked_at` on each result is the moment THAT item's own check completed, not one timestamp shared across the call.
start_login3 of 3 parameters describedStart a login session by sending an authentication challenge to the user's chosen channel (Telegram, WhatsApp, SMS, or email). Returns a session ID and, FOR TELEGRAM AND WHATSAPP ONLY, deep_link, qr_code (base64 PNG) and qr_text (UTF-8 text QR for terminal display); on sms it returns sms_message with sms_dids instead, and on email nothing to display. Agent usage: (1) Call start_login with the desired channel and phone_number (for SMS) or email (for email). (2) Present the challenge, and WHICH FIELD depends on the channel. On telegram/whatsapp pass `deep_link` to render_auth_link, which returns the clickable link and a QR code to you; in a chat client the link is what the user acts on, since they are usually on the same machine. On sms `deep_link` is an EMPTY STRING and render_auth_link will reject it — show `sms_message` and let the user pick a number from `sms_dids`. `suggested_region` is always set, but the matching ENTRY in `sms_dids` may be missing (europe and israel appear only when a number is configured) or present with an empty `did`, so offer that region first only when `sms_dids[suggested_region]` exists and carries a number, and otherwise offer whatever the object does. On email there is nothing to display at all, and nothing to check either: a result means the mail was accepted for delivery, so tell the user to open their inbox. A delivery failure is an ERROR here, not a field — the tool answers `challenge_delivery_failed` and NO session exists, so do not call wait_for_login; retry, or offer another channel. Never hand `qr_text` to a link renderer — it is the link already rendered as QR art, so print it verbatim inside a fenced code block or not at all, because its rows stop scanning the moment one wraps or a blank line lands between them. (3) Once your reply shows the user the challenge, call wait_for_login with the returned session ID to poll until the user completes authentication. On email, tell the user to open the link and press "Sign in the browser that requested this": the page also offers "Sign in here", which signs in the browser they clicked from instead of this connection. Terminal states: "verified" (login succeeded), "failed", "expired", "completed_elsewhere" (email only: the user pressed "Sign in here" on the email link's page, so the browser they clicked from is signed in and this connection never will be — tell them so, and start a new login if this connection still needs one). The user does not see tool results — most clients fold them away, render_auth_link's output included. Before you wait or poll, put what the user must act on into your own reply text: the link itself (not a sentence announcing it), the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox.
wait_for_login2 of 2 parameters describedPoll a login session until the user completes authentication. Uses exponential backoff (2s initial, 1.5x, 30s max) with jitter. Agent usage: Call this after start_login with the returned session ID. Terminal states: "verified" (login succeeded — this server keeps the session for this connection and signs your own account records with it: emails, phones, domains, API keys, 2FA, DNS credentials, verification requests, your Public page's username and proof list), "failed", "expired", "completed_elsewhere" (email only: the user pressed "Sign in here" on the email link's page, so the browser they clicked from is signed in and this connection never will be — tell them so, and start a new login if this connection still needs one), "account_access_off" (WhatsApp, Telegram or SMS only: the number signs in to an account that turned its Account access off, so nobody is signed in and no account is created — tell the user to sign in with an email or phone that has account access). A result with status "pending" means the wait ran out before the user finished — call this tool again with the same id. Before calling this for a challenge you created, make sure your reply text already shows the user what to act on — the link itself, the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox; a link that appeared only in a tool result is one they never saw.
create_account3 of 3 parameters describedCreate an account-bootstrap session for agent-driven onboarding. Public endpoint (no API key required). Returns a session id, channel-specific instructions, and — FOR TELEGRAM AND WHATSAPP ONLY — deep_link, qr_code (base64 PNG) and qr_text (UTF-8 text QR). The endpoint is safe to call regardless of whether the submitted identity is new: completing verification transparently creates a User when none exists, or logs the user in when one already does. The response is intentionally uniform — the server does NOT reveal whether the identity is already registered (this would be a user-enumeration oracle). If the agent needs to distinguish new-vs-returning users, call `get_current_user` after verification and inspect the user's `created_at`. EMAIL CHANNEL SENDS NOTHING HERE. The response carries email_sent=false and send_required=true: confirm with the user that the address is theirs, then call send_account_email. The other channels dispatch nothing either way — the user sends the first message themselves (reverse OTP). Agent usage: (1) Call create_account with the user's chosen channel. (2) For email, confirm with the user and call send_account_email. On telegram/whatsapp pass `deep_link` to render_auth_link, which returns the clickable link with a QR code beneath it to you. On sms `deep_link` is an EMPTY STRING and render_auth_link will reject it — show `sms_message`, which is what the user sends; this response carries no destination number, so do not invent one. Do not hand `qr_text` to a link renderer either — it is the link already rendered as QR art; print it verbatim inside a fenced code block if a real terminal needs the QR. (3) Once your reply shows the user the challenge, call wait_for_account_creation with the session id until verification completes. On email the user must press "Sign in the browser that requested this" on the link's page — "Sign in here" signs in the browser they clicked from, and the wait then ends with "completed_elsewhere". (4) On verified, JWT + refresh cookies are set; proceed with whatever follow-up the agent was asked to do. The user does not see tool results — most clients fold them away, render_auth_link's output included. Before you wait or poll, put what the user must act on into your own reply text: the link itself (not a sentence announcing it), the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox.
send_account_email1 of 1 parameter describedDeliver the verification email for an account-bootstrap session created with channel "email". Public endpoint (no API key required). Why this is a separate call: create_account deliberately sends NOTHING. A message from proof.holdings arriving in someone's inbox is an act with a person on the other end, so it takes an explicit second step rather than being a side effect of creating a session. ASK THE USER to confirm the address is theirs before calling this — do not call it automatically after create_account. The other channels (telegram, whatsapp, sms) never need this: the user sends the first message themselves (reverse OTP), so nothing is dispatched to them at all. One session sends at most one email, including under concurrent calls. A repeat answers 410 already_sent, which means the material backing the send is gone: usually because the email went out, occasionally because an attempt was interrupted mid-send and nothing was delivered. Do not tell the user a message was sent on the strength of a 410 — create a new session instead. (A session the recipient cancelled via the decline link, or an expired one, answers 404, not 410.) If delivery fails the response carries email_sent=false and the call can be retried.
wait_for_account_creation2 of 2 parameters describedPoll an account-bootstrap session until the user completes verification. Uses exponential backoff (2s initial, 1.5x, 30s max) with jitter. Agent usage: Call this after create_account with the returned session id. Terminal states: "verified" (this server keeps the session for this connection; the `user_id` field in the terminal body identifies the authenticated user), "expired", "completed_elsewhere" (email only: the user pressed "Sign in here" on the email link's page, so the browser they clicked from is signed in and this connection never will be — tell them so, and start a new login if this connection still needs one), "account_access_off" (WhatsApp, Telegram or SMS only: the number signs in to an account that turned its Account access off, so nobody is signed in and no account is created — tell the user to sign in with an email or phone that has account access). A result with status "pending" means the wait ran out before the user finished — call this tool again with the same id. Works identically whether the underlying flow created a new User or logged in an existing one. Before calling this for a challenge you created, make sure your reply text already shows the user what to act on — the link itself, the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox; a link that appeared only in a tool result is one they never saw.
start_2fa_for_action7 of 7 parameters describedStart a 2FA challenge that grants the authenticated user permission to perform a sensitive action. The 2FA must complete on a channel DIFFERENT from the user's last login channel (the backend enforces this). On success a grant is stored keyed by the user id and action_type; middleware on the protected endpoint reads the grant and allows the mutation. Destructive action types (api_key_create, api_key_revoke, api_key_regenerate, api_key_expiry, api_key_view, account_delete, phone_remove, email_remove, phone_primary, email_primary, revocation_bulk, domain_remove, profile_delete) are capped at 5min TTL and forced single-use by server policy. A step-up for revocation_bulk, phone_remove, email_remove, domain_remove, profile_delete or account_delete is bound to `targets` — the exact ids the protected call will carry. Configuration scopes (settings_write, profile_update, templates_write) allow up to 24h TTL and caller-chosen single_use — useful for agents making multiple settings mutations in one session. Agent usage: (1) Attempt the sensitive call; if you get `403 2fa_required` note the `action_type`. (2) Call start_2fa_for_action with that action_type and a channel different from the login channel. (3) Present the challenge: on telegram/whatsapp pass `deep_link` to render_auth_link; on sms show `sms_message` and the number to send it to; on email check the response first: with more than one verified email and no `email_id` given, it answers 200 with `requires_email_selection: true` and `available_emails` — NO session was started and nothing was sent, so ask the user which address and call again with `email_id` rather than telling them to open a mailbox. Never hand `qr_text` to a link renderer — it is the link already rendered as QR art. Print it verbatim inside a fenced code block only when a real terminal needs the QR. (4) Call wait_for_2fa until the session is verified. (5) Retry the original sensitive call. The user does not see tool results — most clients fold them away, render_auth_link's output included. Before you wait or poll, put what the user must act on into your own reply text: the link itself (not a sentence announcing it), the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.
render_auth_link2 of 2 parameters describedRender an authorization or verification URL as a clickable link followed by a scannable QR code inside a fenced code block. This is a local computation tool — no HTTP request is made. It renders https: and sms: links only — the schemes the Proof API hands out. Its output comes back to you, not to the user: copy the link, and the QR block inside its fence, into your reply. Agent usage: pass a LINK field from an earlier response — `deep_link` (create_session, create_chat_id_discovery always; start_login, create_account, start_2fa, start_2fa_for_action, start_add_phone on telegram/whatsapp ONLY, where on sms and email that field is empty or absent altogether and this tool rejects it either way), `challenge.deep_link` (create_verification, messenger channels only), or `telegram_deep_link` / `whatsapp_deep_link`. Do NOT pass `qr_text` to this tool: that field is a QR code already rendered as text, and this tool takes a link. When a response gives you `qr_text` and no link, print it verbatim inside a fenced code block instead — its rows only scan while they stay adjacent, so a blank line or wrapped row destroys the code. The user does not see tool results — most clients fold them away, render_auth_link's output included. Before you wait or poll, put what the user must act on into your own reply text: the link itself (not a sentence announcing it), the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox.
proof_holdings_statusno parametersReports whether this server's Proof of Delegation holds, as answered by proof.holdings, its issuer: the status, the delegating principal, the delegate and the expiry. Read-only; takes no arguments.
Tested in a sandbox with an empty environment: no API keys, a throwaway folder, nothing from a real account. A passing test shows the server runs and responds. It is not a security audit.