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Keel GRC MCP server
Model Context Protocol server for the Keel GRC API: drive your compliance program from Claude, Cursor, or any MCP client.
Tested by ConnectATDScore 88 out of 100. Tested 2026-11-19 on package version 0.9.0. Package: keelgrc-mcp · source
Score breakdown
| Runs | 18 / 20 | |
|---|---|---|
| Tool descriptions | 18 / 20 | |
| Package safety | 20 / 20 | |
| Maintenance | 20 / 20 | |
| Adoption | 12 / 20 |
What we saw
- Starts and answers the MCP handshake: yes (2.7 seconds including download)
- Tools offered: 13
- Last published: 2026-10-16
- Weekly downloads (npm): 1,224
- License: MIT · Direct dependencies: 2
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Talk to ConnectATDTools and how they are described
Agents choose tools from these descriptions. Under each name you can see how many of its parameters are explained.
keel_whoamino parametersVerify the API key and return the connected Keel organization as {"org":{"id","name","tier"}}, where "tier" is the plan (free / starter / pro / enterprise / msp). Takes no arguments. Use this first to confirm which workspace you are acting on.
keel_membersno parametersList the people with a seat in this workspace, as {"members":[{"id","email","name","role"}]}, where "role" is owner / admin / member / auditor. Takes no arguments; read-only. These ids are what "ownerMembershipId" on a policy, "ownerId" on evidence and "assigneeId" on a task hold, and the emails are what "ownerEmail" (policies), "assigneeEmail" (tasks) and "businessOwnerEmail" / "securityOwnerEmail" (vendors) must match. Vendors hold the ids as "businessOwnerId" and "securityOwnerId". This is not the HR directory: keel_people lists employees, including ones with no Keel seat.
keel_frameworksno parametersList every compliance framework the workspace has APPLIED, each with its readiness. Takes no arguments. Each item has "key", "name", "version", "primary" (true for the one the dashboard leads with), "readiness" (percent, integer), "total", "applicable", "covered", "inProgress", "gap", "unaddressed", "notApplicable", "clauseCount" and "bundle". "total" is the clauses still in scope for this workspace, so clauseCount minus total is what has been excluded. This is the tool to use when asked how the workspace is doing: keel_readiness answers for ISO/IEC 27001 only, whether or not the workspace runs it.
keel_readinessno parametersGet the audit-readiness summary for ISO/IEC 27001:2022. This endpoint covers that framework only, not whichever framework the workspace has applied, so use keel_frameworks for the workspace's own frameworks. Takes no arguments. Returns "framework", "version", "readiness" (percent, integer), "total", "applicable", "covered", "inProgress", "gap", "unaddressed" and "notApplicable".
keel_controls9 of 10 parameters describedRead and maintain the workspace security controls and their clause mappings. Actions: "list" (optional "query" substring over key and name), "get", "create", "update", "delete", "mappings", "map", "unmap". Each control has "id", "key", "name", "description", "state", "ownerEmail" and "ownerName" — note the status field is called "state", not "status". "get" also returns "crosswalks", the clauses the control is mapped to, as [{"frameworkKey","requirementRef","requirementTitle"}]; "list" does not. "create" adds one custom control, as "Add a control" does in the app: "name" is required, "description" is optional, and "key" is your own identifier (at most 60 characters, not shaped like a uuid, with no control or invisible formatting characters, unique in the workspace); omit it and Keel generates one. A key the workspace already uses is refused, and the error carries the existing control. A new control starts "not_started" with no owner and no mappings, so set "state" or "ownerEmail" with "update" and clauses with "map" afterwards. To add a framework's recommended controls, already mapped to its clauses, use keel_starter_controls instead. "mappings" lists the clauses a control is mapped to, as {"crosswalks":[{"frameworkKey","requirementRef","requirementTitle"}]}. "map" maps a control to one clause and "unmap" removes one mapping; a clause only counts toward readiness once a control is mapped to it. "map" needs a framework the workspace has applied (see keel_frameworks) and a "requirementRef" Keel authors for it, written exactly as Keel writes it (e.g. "4.1"); a section heading is refused because readiness never scores one. Mapping twice is harmless and reports "created": false. "unmap" on a clause the control is not mapped to fails rather than reporting success. "create", updating "name", "description" or "ownerEmail", "map" and "unmap" need the owner or admin role; moving "state" alone is open to any role except auditor. Deleting a control also removes its framework mappings and its evidence and risk links, which moves the readiness denominator for every framework it was mapped to.
keel_starter_controls1 of 1 parameter describedAdd a framework's recommended controls to the workspace, already mapped to its clauses. This is exactly what the "Add recommended controls" button on the Controls page does. Takes "frameworkKey" (e.g. "iso-9001"); the framework must be one the workspace has APPLIED (keel_frameworks lists them), and applying a framework is done in the Keel app, not here. A control the workspace already has keeps its name, description and state and only gains the clause mappings. Safe to repeat: a second call adds nothing. Returns "frameworkKey", "frameworkName", "starterControls", "controlsAdded", "controlsPresent", "mappingsAdded" and "mappingsSkipped" (normally 0). A framework Keel does not ship, or one with no recommended controls, is an error. Needs the owner or admin role.
keel_tasks7 of 8 parameters describedRead and maintain the workspace compliance tasks. Actions: "list" (optional "query" substring over the title), "get", "create", "update". Each task has "id", "title", "description", "status" (open / in_progress / blocked / done / cancelled), "dueAt", "createdAt", "relatedEntityType" and the assignee as "assigneeId" / "assigneeName" / "assigneeEmail". There is NO "delete", and that is not a gap in this server: Keel has no delete-a-task operation on any surface, the app included, so nothing to map exists. Retire a task by updating its "status" to "cancelled", which keeps it as a record of what was decided. "update" changes the status, the assignee, or both; title, description and due date are not editable after creation, in the app either. Assign with "assigneeEmail", which must be the email of a workspace member (see keel_members) or the call fails and nothing is written; the assignment fires the task.assigned webhook but sends no email. Tasks have no start date. Any role except auditor.
keel_risks11 of 13 parameters describedRead and maintain the workspace risk register. Actions: "list", "get", "create", "update", "delete". Each risk has "id", "title", "description", "category", "likelihood", "impact", "inherentScore", "treatment", "residualLikelihood", "residualImpact", "residualScore", "status", "owner", "ownerEmail", "level" (low / medium / high), "mitigatingControls" and "implementedControls". The list is sorted by status first (open before closed), then level, then score, so an open low risk appears above a closed high one; within a status, unscored risks come first. Likelihood and impact are 1-5 and are clamped to that range. A risk can be UNSCORED: create it without "likelihood" and "impact" (or with null), and "likelihood", "impact", "inherentScore" and "level" read back as null until it is scored. Keel does not invent a default score, so do not send 3 for a risk the source never assessed. "update" changes only the fields you send. Creating and updating need any role except auditor; deleting needs the owner or admin role and is irreversible.
keel_vendors8 of 13 parameters describedRead and maintain the third-party vendor register. Actions: "list" (optional "query" substring over the name), "get", "create", "update", "delete". Each vendor has "id", "name", "website", "contactEmail", "tier", "inherentTier", "residualTier", "auth", "authCredits", "status", "dataAccess", "notes", "lastReviewedAt", "reviewDue", "thirdPartyId", and the owners as "businessOwnerId" and "securityOwnerId" (workspace member ids; keel_members maps them to people). READ THE TIER FIELDS CAREFULLY: "tier" on the way out is the EFFECTIVE (residual) criticality after the vendor's access controls are credited, while "tier" on the way in sets the INHERENT criticality. Reading a vendor and sending its "tier" straight back therefore writes the residual into the inherent value and ratchets it down; send "inherentTier" back as "tier" instead. The authentication posture ("auth": mfa, passwordPolicy, sso) is readable and NOT writable here, because the underlying update treats any one of the three as the caller owning all three and would silently clear the other two. Change it in the Keel app. Set owners on "update" with "businessOwnerEmail" and "securityOwnerEmail", each the email of a workspace member (see keel_members); an address that matches no member fails the call and nothing is written, null clears that owner, and omitting one leaves it as it is. "create" takes no owners, so create first and then update. An owner change fires no webhook event. Creating and updating need any role except auditor; deleting does too, matching the app.
keel_people6 of 12 parameters describedRead and maintain the workspace personnel directory. Actions: "list" (optional "query" substring over full name and email), "get", "create", "update", "delete". Each person has "id", "source", "externalId", "email", "fullName", "jobTitle", "department", "groups", "managerEmail", "status" and "lastSyncedAt". "create" is an upsert keyed on email: re-sending an existing address updates that person rather than duplicating them, and the response includes "created". On an existing manually added person, "create" replaces the whole profile, so a field you leave out is cleared; use "update" to change one field. A person whose "source" is not "manual" is synced from an identity connector, so their profile is read-only here: "update" is refused naming the connector, and "create" leaves the profile as it is. Their "status" can still be changed by either. DELETING IS NOT OFFBOARDING: a person who has left should be updated to "deprovisioned", which keeps the row and writes the audit entry an auditor asks for, whereas deleting removes the evidence they were ever in the directory. ROLE: every action except list and get, "create" included, needs an API key created by an owner or admin. A key belonging to a member or an auditor can list and get, and gets 403 "This action requires the owner or admin role." on the rest; there is no way around that from this tool, so tell the user they need an owner or admin key.
keel_policies12 of 14 parameters describedRead and maintain the workspace policies. Actions: "list" (optional "query" substring over the title), "get", "create", "update", "delete". "list" returns "id", "key", "title", "status", "version", "updatedAt", "approvedAt", "reviewDue" and "ownerMembershipId" (a workspace member id; keel_members maps it to a person); "get" adds "effectiveDate", the "markdown" body and the template "fields", so read one policy with "get" rather than trying to find its text in the list. "create" derives "key" from the title when you do not supply one, and a policy is identified by its key, so reusing a key targets the existing policy instead of making a second one. "update" sends only the fields you pass, merges "fields" onto the stored values rather than replacing them, and records a revision in the policy history attributed to the member the key acts as, exactly as a save in the app does. Set the owner on "update" with "ownerEmail" (the email of a workspace member) or "ownerMembershipId", not both; "create" takes no owner, status or dates, so create first and then update. Creating and updating need any role except auditor; deleting needs the owner or admin role and is irreversible, with no restore window and no way to reconstruct the body afterwards.
keel_evidence11 of 12 parameters describedRead and maintain collected evidence. Actions: "list" (optional "since" ISO date-time, returning only evidence collected strictly after it), "get", "create", "update", "delete". Each item has "id", "type" (file / link / attestation), "title", "description", "filename", "sizeBytes", "contentType", "url", "collectedAt", "expiresAt" and "controls" (the linked controls, as {"id","key"}); "get" also returns "ownerId". "create" attaches a URL as link evidence and covers LINK EVIDENCE ONLY — the REST API also accepts a file upload as multipart form data, which a stdio MCP server cannot stream, so upload files in the Keel app or against the REST API directly. A control named on "create" must exist in this workspace or the call fails and nothing is created. "update" sets or clears the review date and the owner, and links or unlinks controls with "linkControls" / "unlinkControls" (control ids or keys; every one must exist in this workspace or nothing changes). Title, description and the file itself are not editable in the app either, so replace an item by reporting it again. Evidence cannot be attached to a vendor. Deleting also removes the stored file and needs any role except auditor.
keel_webhooks3 of 4 parameters describedRead and maintain the workspace webhook subscriptions. Actions: "list", "create", "rotate", "delete". Each subscription has "id", "targetUrl", "event" and "createdVia". "list" shows the full "targetUrl" only to an owner or admin key; any other key sees just its origin (https://host), because a full target URL can work as a credential. There is no "get" and no "update", because the REST API has neither: read one by listing them, and replace a subscription by deleting it and creating another. "create" requires a public HTTPS URL; the API rejects http://, localhost and private network addresses. "event" must be "all" or the exact name of an event Keel emits, such as control.status_changed or task.created; omit it to get "all", which receives every event. The API rejects any other name with 400 and creates nothing, and its error message lists every valid name, so fix a rejected name from that list rather than guessing again. Each delivery is a JSON body { id, event, data, orgId, at } where "id" identifies the event. "create" returns the subscription's signing "secret" (starts with whsec_), and it is shown ONCE: "list" never returns it, so give it to the user straight away to store with the receiving endpoint. "rotate" (takes "id") replaces a lost or exposed secret: it returns the new "secret", also shown once, and "previousSecretExpiresAt", 24 hours out, until which the old secret keeps signing too. Every delivery carries "x-keel-event-id", "x-keel-subscription-id" and "x-keel-signature". The signature header is "v1=" plus the lowercase hex HMAC-SHA256 of the raw request body, keyed with the whole secret string; during a rotation window it holds two comma-separated "v1=" values, current first. The receiver recomputes the HMAC over the exact bytes it received, accepts if it equals any "v1=" value (constant-time comparison), can reject a body whose "at" timestamp is more than a few minutes old to refuse replays, and should drop a repeated "x-keel-event-id", since a delivery can arrive twice. If the server is not configured to seal secrets, "create" and "rotate" fail with 503 and change nothing. ROTATING AND DELETING NEED THE OWNER OR ADMIN ROLE. The delete gate is new: that endpoint used to accept any valid key, so an integration running on a key created before keys carried an actor now gets 403 there and the key has to be re-created. Deleting is idempotent, so a success does not prove a subscription existed; list them to confirm.
Tested in a sandbox with an empty environment: no API keys, a throwaway folder, nothing from a real account. A passing test shows the server runs and responds. It is not a security audit.